Maharishi Mahesh Yogi DiesBy Mike Corder, Associated Press WriterThe Associated PressTuesday, February 5, 2008(02-05) 15:37 PST The Hague, Netherlands (AP) -Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, a guru to the Beatles whointroduced the West to transcendental meditation,died Tuesday at his home in the Dutch town ofVlodrop, a spokesman said. He was thought to be 91years old."He died peacefully at about 7 p.m.," said BobRoth, a spokesman for the TranscendentalMeditation movement that the Maharishi founded.
Hesaid his death appeared to be due to "naturalcauses, his age."Once dismissed as hippie mysticism, the Hindupractice of mind control that Maharishi taught,called transcendental meditation, gradually gainedmedical respectability.He began teaching TM in 1955 and brought thetechnique to the United States in 1959. But themovement really took off after the Beatles visitedhis ashram in India in 1968, although he had afamous falling out with the rock stars when hediscovered them using drugs at his Himalayanretreat.With the help of celebrity endorsements, Maharishi— a Hindi-language title for Great Seer — parlayedhis interpretations of ancient scripture into amulti-million- dollar global empire.After 50 years of teaching, Maharishi turned tolarger themes, with grand designs to harness thepower of group meditation to create world peaceand to mobilize his devotees to banish povertyfrom the earth.Maharishi's roster of famous meditators ran fromThe Rolling Stones to Clint Eastwood and new agepreacher Deepak Chopra.Director David Lynch, creator of dark and violentfilms, lectured at college campuses about the"ocean of tranquility" he found in more than 30years of practicing transcendental meditation.Some 5 million people devoted 20 minutes everymorning and evening reciting a simple sound, ormantra, and delving into their consciousness.
"Don't fight darkness. Bring the light, anddarkness will disappear," Maharishi said in a 2006interview, repeating one of his own mantras.Donations and the $2,500 fee to learn TM financedthe construction of Peace Palaces, or meditationcenters, in dozens of cities around the world.
Itpaid for hundreds of new schools in India.In 1971, Maharishi founded a university inFairfield, Iowa, that taught meditation alongsidethe arts and sciences to 700 students and servedorganic vegetarian food in its cafeterias.Supporters pointed to hundreds of scientificstudies showing that meditation reduces stress,lowers blood pressure, improves concentration andraises results for students and businessmen.Skeptics ridiculed his plan to raise $10 trillionto end poverty by sponsoring organic farming inthe world's poorest countries.
They scoffed at hisnotion that meditation groups, acting like psychicshock troops, can end conflict."To resolve problems through negotiation is a verychildish approach," he said.In 1986, two groups founded by his organizationwere sued in the U.S. by former disciples whoaccused it of fraud, negligence and intentionallyinflicting emotional damage. A jury, however,refused to award punitive damages.Over the years, Maharishi also was accused offraud by former pupils who claim he failed toteach them to fly. "Yogic flying," showcased asthe ultimate level of transcendence, was neverwitnessed as anything more than TM followerssitting in the cross-legged lotus position andbouncing across spongy mats.Maharishi was born Mahesh Srivastava in centralIndia, reportedly on Jan. 12, 1917 — though herefused to confirm the date or discuss his earlylife.
He studied physics at Allahabad University beforebecoming secretary to a well known Hindu holy man.After the death of his teacher, Maharishi wentinto a nomadic two-year retreat of silence in theHimalayan foothills of northern India.
With his background in physics, he brought hismessage to the West in a language that mixed theoccult and science that became the buzz of collegecampuses. He described TM as "the unified field ofall the laws of nature."Maharishi's trademark flowing beard and long,graying hair appeared on the cover of the leadingnews magazines of the day.
But aides say Maharishi became disillusioned thatTM had become identified with the counterculture,and he spent more time at his ashram in Rishikeshin the Himalayan foothills to run his globalaffairs.In 1990 he moved onto the wooded grounds of ahistoric Franciscan monastery in the southernDutch village of Vlodrop, about 125 milessoutheast of Amsterdam.Concerned about his fragile health, he secludedhimself in two rooms of the wooden pavilion hebuilt on the compound, speaking only by video toaides around the world and even to his closestadvisers in the same building.
John Hagelin, a theoretical physicist who ran forthe U.S. presidency three times on theMaharishi-backed Natural Law Party, said that fromthe Dutch location Maharishi had daylong access tofollowers in India, Europe and the Americas."He runs several shifts of us into the ground,"said Hagelin, Maharishi's closest aid, speaking inVlodrop about his then-89-year- old mentor. "He isa fountainhead of innovation and new ideas — fartoo many than you can ever follow up."- - - Amsterdam-based Associated Press writer Arthur Maxcontributed to this report.http://www.sfgate. com/flat/ archive/2008/ 02/05/news/ archive/2008/ 02/05/internatio nal/i152501S66. html?tsp= 1Jai Maharaj, Jyotishi Om Shanti
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
India 4 th Top Holder of world currency
The world's top holders of foreign currency reserves are:
1) China - $1.5 trillion;
2) Japan - $948 billion;
3) Russia - $479.4 billion;
4) India - $279.5 billion;
5) Taiwan - $272.8 billion;
6) South Korea - $261.8billion;
7) Singapore - $163.6 billion;
8) Brazil- $163.5 billion; and
9) Hong Kong - $146.9 billion.
1) China - $1.5 trillion;
2) Japan - $948 billion;
3) Russia - $479.4 billion;
4) India - $279.5 billion;
5) Taiwan - $272.8 billion;
6) South Korea - $261.8billion;
7) Singapore - $163.6 billion;
8) Brazil- $163.5 billion; and
9) Hong Kong - $146.9 billion.
Pakistan may get Divided
February 1, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
Drawn and Quartered
By SELIG S. HARRISON
Washington
WHATEVER the outcome of the Pakistani elections, now scheduled for Feb. 18, the existing multiethnic Pakistani state is not likely to survive for long unless it is radically restructured.
Given enough American pressure, a loosely united, confederated Pakistan could still be preserved by reinstating and liberalizing the defunct 1973 Constitution, which has been shelved by successive military rulers.
But as matters stand, the Punjabi-dominated regime of Pervez Musharraf is headed for a bloody confrontation with the country’s Pashtun, Baluch and Sindhi minorities that could well lead to the breakup of Pakistan into three sovereign entities.
In that event, the Pashtuns, concentrated in the northwestern tribal areas, would join with their ethnic brethren across the Afghan border (some 40 million of them combined) to form an independent “Pashtunistan.”
The Sindhis in the southeast, numbering 23 million, would unite with the six million Baluch tribesmen in the southwest to establish a federation along the Arabian Sea from India to Iran.
“Pakistan” would then be a nuclear-armed Punjabi rump state.
In historical context, such a breakup would not be surprising. There had never been a national entity encompassing the areas now constituting Pakistan, an ethnic mélange thrown together hastily by the British for strategic reasons when they partitioned the subcontinent in 1947.
For those of Pashtun, Sindhi and Baluch ethnicity, independence from colonial rule created a bitter paradox. After resisting Punjabi domination for centuries, they found themselves subjected to Punjabi-dominated military regimes that have appropriated many of the natural resources in the minority provinces — particularly the natural gas deposits in the Baluch areas — and siphoned off much of the Indus River’s waters as they flow through the Punjab.
The resulting Punjabi-Pashtun animosity helps explain why the United States is failing to get effective Pakistani cooperation in fighting terrorists. The Pashtuns living along the Afghan border are happy to give sanctuary from Punjabi forces to the Taliban, which is composed primarily of fellow Pashtuns, and to its Qaeda friends.
Pashtun civilian casualties resulting from Pakistani and American air strikes on both sides of the border are breeding a potent underground Pashtun nationalist movement. Its initial objective is to unite all Pashtuns in Pakistan, now divided among political jurisdictions, into a unified province. In time, however, its leaders envisage full nationhood. After all, before the British came, the Pashtuns had been politically united under the banner of an Afghan empire that stretched eastward into the Punjabi heartland.
The Baluch people, for their part, have been waging intermittent insurgencies since their forced incorporation into Pakistan in 1947. In the current warfare Pakistani forces are widely reported to be deploying American-supplied aircraft and intelligence equipment that was intended for use in Afghan border areas. Their victims are forging military links with Sindhi nationalist groups that have been galvanized into action by the death of Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi hero as was her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The breakup of Pakistan would be a costly and destabilizing development that can still be avoided, but only if the United States and other foreign donors use their enormous aid leverage to convince Islamabad that it should not only put the 1973 Constitution back into effect, but amend it to go beyond the limited degree of autonomy it envisaged.
Eventually, the minorities want a central government that would retain control only over defense, foreign affairs, international trade, communications and currency. It would no longer have the power to oust an elected provincial government, and would have to renegotiate royalties on resources with the provinces.
In the shorter term, the Bush administration should scrap plans to send Special Forces into border areas in pursuit of Al Qaeda, which would only strengthen Islamist links with Pashtun nationalists. It should help secular Pashtun forces to compete with the Islamists by pushing for fair representation of Pashtun areas now barred from political participation.
It is often argued that the United States must stand by Mr. Musharraf and a unitary Pakistani state to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. But the nuclear safeguards depend on the Pakistani Army as an institution, not on the president. They would not be affected by a break-up, since the nuclear weapons would remain under the control of the Punjabi rump state and its army.
The Army has built up a far-flung empire of economic enterprises in all parts of Pakistan with assets in the tens of billions, and can best protect its interests by defusing the escalating conflict with the minorities. Similarly, the minorities would profit from cooperative economic relations with the Punjab, and for this reason prefer confederal autonomy to secession. All concerned, including the United States, have a profound stake in stopping the present slide to Balkanization.
Selig S. Harrison is the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy and the author of “In Afghanistan’s Shadow,” a study of Baluch nationalism.
Op-Ed Contributor
Drawn and Quartered
By SELIG S. HARRISON
Washington
WHATEVER the outcome of the Pakistani elections, now scheduled for Feb. 18, the existing multiethnic Pakistani state is not likely to survive for long unless it is radically restructured.
Given enough American pressure, a loosely united, confederated Pakistan could still be preserved by reinstating and liberalizing the defunct 1973 Constitution, which has been shelved by successive military rulers.
But as matters stand, the Punjabi-dominated regime of Pervez Musharraf is headed for a bloody confrontation with the country’s Pashtun, Baluch and Sindhi minorities that could well lead to the breakup of Pakistan into three sovereign entities.
In that event, the Pashtuns, concentrated in the northwestern tribal areas, would join with their ethnic brethren across the Afghan border (some 40 million of them combined) to form an independent “Pashtunistan.”
The Sindhis in the southeast, numbering 23 million, would unite with the six million Baluch tribesmen in the southwest to establish a federation along the Arabian Sea from India to Iran.
“Pakistan” would then be a nuclear-armed Punjabi rump state.
In historical context, such a breakup would not be surprising. There had never been a national entity encompassing the areas now constituting Pakistan, an ethnic mélange thrown together hastily by the British for strategic reasons when they partitioned the subcontinent in 1947.
For those of Pashtun, Sindhi and Baluch ethnicity, independence from colonial rule created a bitter paradox. After resisting Punjabi domination for centuries, they found themselves subjected to Punjabi-dominated military regimes that have appropriated many of the natural resources in the minority provinces — particularly the natural gas deposits in the Baluch areas — and siphoned off much of the Indus River’s waters as they flow through the Punjab.
The resulting Punjabi-Pashtun animosity helps explain why the United States is failing to get effective Pakistani cooperation in fighting terrorists. The Pashtuns living along the Afghan border are happy to give sanctuary from Punjabi forces to the Taliban, which is composed primarily of fellow Pashtuns, and to its Qaeda friends.
Pashtun civilian casualties resulting from Pakistani and American air strikes on both sides of the border are breeding a potent underground Pashtun nationalist movement. Its initial objective is to unite all Pashtuns in Pakistan, now divided among political jurisdictions, into a unified province. In time, however, its leaders envisage full nationhood. After all, before the British came, the Pashtuns had been politically united under the banner of an Afghan empire that stretched eastward into the Punjabi heartland.
The Baluch people, for their part, have been waging intermittent insurgencies since their forced incorporation into Pakistan in 1947. In the current warfare Pakistani forces are widely reported to be deploying American-supplied aircraft and intelligence equipment that was intended for use in Afghan border areas. Their victims are forging military links with Sindhi nationalist groups that have been galvanized into action by the death of Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi hero as was her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The breakup of Pakistan would be a costly and destabilizing development that can still be avoided, but only if the United States and other foreign donors use their enormous aid leverage to convince Islamabad that it should not only put the 1973 Constitution back into effect, but amend it to go beyond the limited degree of autonomy it envisaged.
Eventually, the minorities want a central government that would retain control only over defense, foreign affairs, international trade, communications and currency. It would no longer have the power to oust an elected provincial government, and would have to renegotiate royalties on resources with the provinces.
In the shorter term, the Bush administration should scrap plans to send Special Forces into border areas in pursuit of Al Qaeda, which would only strengthen Islamist links with Pashtun nationalists. It should help secular Pashtun forces to compete with the Islamists by pushing for fair representation of Pashtun areas now barred from political participation.
It is often argued that the United States must stand by Mr. Musharraf and a unitary Pakistani state to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. But the nuclear safeguards depend on the Pakistani Army as an institution, not on the president. They would not be affected by a break-up, since the nuclear weapons would remain under the control of the Punjabi rump state and its army.
The Army has built up a far-flung empire of economic enterprises in all parts of Pakistan with assets in the tens of billions, and can best protect its interests by defusing the escalating conflict with the minorities. Similarly, the minorities would profit from cooperative economic relations with the Punjab, and for this reason prefer confederal autonomy to secession. All concerned, including the United States, have a profound stake in stopping the present slide to Balkanization.
Selig S. Harrison is the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy and the author of “In Afghanistan’s Shadow,” a study of Baluch nationalism.
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